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1 Introduction
On February 25th, two Italian citizens were the first official COVID-19 cases in
Austria. The next day, the first Austrian citizen tested positive for COVID-19 in a
Vienna hospital, where he had already spent 10 days in treatment. On March 12th,
the first Austrian died from COVID-19. Simultaneously, the pandemic exploded in
Ischgl, a ski-resort infamous for excessive après-ski partying. This hotspot, together
with the media coverage from Lombardy showing overcrowded hospitals, mortu-
aries, and locked-down cities, triggered a swift and radical response from the Aus-
trian government. On March 13th, the Austrian government enacted a nationwide
lockdown for all schools, universities, kindergartens, all shops except groceries and
pharmacies, and all restaurants and bars. On March 15th, the Austrian parliament
enacted the legal foundation for future measures, including a stay-home-order for a
month. On March 17th, all Austrian airports closed. Although the highstreets were
empty andunemployment numberswere skyrocketing, the radicalmeasures proved
effective in holding back the initial spread of the virus. With only 85 deaths per
million inhabitants, Austria did far better thanmany other countries during this first
wave, e.g. the UK (626 deaths per million), the US (591), France (459), Switzerland
(237), andGermany (112).1 By the end of summer, the swift and consequent actions of
the Austrian government had both prevented the health care system from being
overburdened and curbed an excessive death rate. Yet, the measures caused sub-
stantive damage to the economy and wider society.
Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) of all kinds were severely affected by the
lockdown: CSOs in fields of sports, arts, culture, and education suffered extremely
from the prohibition of all events and the stay-home-order. Social and health care
services faced enormous organizational challenges and additional costs. For some
CSOs the demand for services either persisted or increased with the onset of
COVID-19. Some vulnerable clients needed particular support, and some operations
required complete reorganization. Social businesses operating in industries like
tourism, gastronomyandeventswere specifically hit by the lockdown. The samewas
true forCSOs inyouthworkandeducation.Asmanyparts ofAustrian civil society are
in close relationwith different levels of government, our studywill focus on how this
relationship has developed during the COVID-19 crisis. We thus aim to address the
following questions: How were CSOs affected by the COVID-19 crisis, particularly in
the field of social andhealth care services, andhowdid the configurationof relations
between CSOs and government develop in the first months of the crisis?
1 Caution is advisedwhen comparingdifferent countries and their COVID-19 numbers (Millar et al.
2020).
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Austria’s nonprofit sector has been described as showing strong elements of a
corporatist nonprofit regime (Neumayr et al. 2017). Corporatist elements have
become even more dominant as social services provided by CSOs have become
increasingly important, e.g. in elderly care and childcare. Likewise, collaboration
between the government, CSOs, and public funding is quite prevalent in arts and
culture, sports, and education. In social services, almost 80% of CSO funding
stems from public sources (Pennerstorfer, Schneider, and Reitzinger 2015). Wewill
therefore concentrate our analysis on this field, referred to as social services in
ICNPO, embracing the fields of human health, residential care, and social work
activities in national statistics (NACE). Working within these fields are more than
3000 CSOs (30% of all Austrian CSOs with paid employees), together employing
almost 150,000 employees (65%of all employees in Austrian CSOs), and yielding a
65% of the total 2.3% contribution of all CSOs to GDP (Neumayr et al. 2017). This
makes social services by far the most important field in economic terms. There are
also other important fields that also have close relations with government. Sports
and leisure, for instance, are organized in a matrix of umbrella organizations that
distribute public money to the individual associations. Even in sports, 16% of the
income comes from government sources, with the federal government alone
spending ∼€120 million per year. The funding situation in arts and culture is very
similar. Austria’s landmark public institutions such as the national theaters, opera
houses, and museums, but also the many CSOs in this field depend heavily on
public funding. In view of this, our analysis allows for a generalization overmainly
formal, economically active Austrian nonprofit organizations with paid em-
ployees, though we will also further concentrate on social services.
2 Theory and the Austrian Context
The role of CSOs and their relationship to government varies between countries.
Salamon and Anheier (1998) proposed a typology consisting of four different
nonprofit regimes, formulated along two dimensions: government welfare
spending and sector size. They labeled countries with a sizable nonprofit sector
and high levels of welfare spending as either a corporatist or a welfare partnership
regime. The social-democratic regime is characterized by high levels of welfare
spending, but with a diminished role of nonprofit organizations in welfare provi-
sion. In the liberal nonprofit regime we find low levels of welfare spending, but a
sizeable nonprofit sector. Finally, the statist regime has both low levels of welfare
spending and a small nonprofit sector. In a similar vein, Young (2006) describes
modes of government-nonprofit interaction. A complementary relationship is one
of close cooperation, where both involved parties act as partners. Welfare services
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are funded by the state while nonprofit organizations have the capacities and
knowhow to provide the services in many fields. This relationship is closely con-
nected to Salamon and Anheier’s (1998) welfare partnership type. In a supple-
mentary relationship, nonprofit and public providerswork in parallel, whereby the
nonprofit organization fills a gap in state-run service provision. Finally, in an
adversarial relationship, nonprofit organizations aim at influencing the public
sector, demonstrating the advocacy function of the nonprofit sector (see also
Neumayr and Pennerstorfer 2020).
While these theories describe the role of the nonprofit sector in relation to the
governmentmore generally, other theories focus on the contractual relationship of
the two parties. Through the lenses of agency theory (Jensen and Meckling 1976),
CSOs act as agents on behalf of the government (the principal) by providing wel-
fare services. The theory describes the problem of incomplete contracts and the
agent’s opportunity to exploit these by making use of information asymmetries,
such as a CSO knowing details regarding the success or failure of an ongoing
project’s operation. In order to overcome information asymmetries, public au-
thorities seek to introduce monitoring mechanisms, incentives and sanctions as
well as increased reporting requirements (Van Slyke 2007).
Another solution to cope with information asymmetries is relational con-
tracting, which emphasizes long-term relationships, trust and reputation among
the involved parties (Bertelli and Smith 2010; Brown and Troutt 2004; Christensen
and Lægreid 2010; Isaksson, Blomqvist, and Winblad 2017). In this relationship,
CSOs act as stewards (Van Slyke 2007). Goal convergence, shared collective in-
terests, cooperation, joint decision making, and an exchange of information
describe such a relation and point towards a more collaborative governance (see
also Neumayr and Pennerstorfer 2020 and Mendoza and Vernis 2008 who further
discuss the emergence of the relational state).
The relationship between government and CSOs in Austria can be categorized
as a corporatist/welfare partnership regime. Traditionally, they play an important
role in public service delivery in corporatist welfare states. Accordingly, Austrian
nonprofit organizations deliver a major share of social services, with the rela-
tionship to the public falling under the welfare-partnership typology. Figures for
the year 2013 show that the nonprofit sector accounted for 89% of total value-
added in the category “social work activitieswithout accommodation”, and almost
45%of total value-added in “residential care activities” (Leisch, Pennerstorfer, and
Schneider 2016, 382).
This assessment is consistent with the more general interpretation of the
Austrian state as a corporatist welfare state (see e.g. Österle and Heitzmann 2020).
Federal, regional, and local authorities are all involved in welfare policy making
and implementation. In general, the Austrian democracy is characterized as
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strongly consensus-oriented, and the so-called “social partnership” between
employers’ representatives and trade unions has a strong role in policymaking
(Falkner and Leiber 2004). Additionally, the welfare state has a long history of
continuity of policy making. Österle and Heitzmann (2020) describe recent
changes within the Austrian welfare state in light of demographic changes, the
2008 economic crisis and the 2015 refugee crisis. They assess these changes as
incremental and gradual rather than radical, and again highlight continuity as a
key feature of Austrian welfare policy making.
These features also describe idiosyncrasies of the Austrian civil society,
namely corporatism and federalism, as well as the close ties between nonprofit
organizations and political parties and churches as defining elements for nonprofit
organizations (Neumayr et al. 2017; Pennerstorfer, Schneider, and Badelt 2013).
Nonprofits, especially large and well-established ones, enjoy a high level of po-
litical influence due to the country’s system of social partnership. These nonprofit
organizations often exhibit links to political parties or to the Catholic or Protestant
church. Nonprofit organizationswith ties to Christian-democratic ideas (relating to
the People’s Party or the church) or with ties to social-democratic ideas (relating to
the Social Democratic Party) often exist side by side and deliver similar services
(Neumayr et al. 2017).
Over the last 20 years, public authorities have increasingly sought to estab-
lish a quasi-market by introducing public tendering and refining contractual ar-
rangements. This resulted in increasing competition among CSOs as service
providers, and in some areas also to market-entry of for-profits (Heitzmann,
Österle, and Pennerstorfer 2015). These newpublicmanagement initiatives elicited
increased professionalization and accountability among nonprofit organizations
(Hwang and Powell 2009). Some authors describemarketization and hybridization
of CSOs as signs of a change from a corporatist towards a post-corporatist welfare
state (Bode 2011; Suykens, De Rynck, and Verschuere 2020).
These changes also become visible when examining the income structure of
social service providers. In 2013, income from government accounted for almost
80% of total income of CSOs in social services (Pennerstorfer, Schneider, and
Reitzinger 2015). Within this income category, one can further differentiate be-
tween income from contracts with public authorities (∼63% of total income in the
category “social work activities except residential care”) and income from public
subsidies (∼17%). As in many other countries, the mechanism of public funding
has shifted from subsidies to contracts (for an example, see e.g. Neumayr and
Pennerstorfer 2020). Comparing the income structure in a panel of Austrian CSOs
in 2005 and 2013 revealed that income from sales, which includes income from
contracts with public authorities, increased by around 7% during this time period,
while income from subsidies decreased by around 6% (Pennerstorfer, Schneider,
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andReitzinger 2015, 41). The survey also revealed that public funding comes froma
variety of sources at federal, regional and local levels. The regional level is themost
important income source for many social service providers (Pennerstorfer,
Schneider, and Reitzinger 2015, 21). On average, the organizations get funding
from two different public authorities.
To estimate how Austrian CSOs dealt with prior crises, we turn first to the 2008
economic crisis. Simsa, Herndler, and Simic (2016, 19) report a reduction of public
funding of social service providers due to the crisis, but CSOs were affected
differently at the time and over the following years. Organizations often experi-
enced funding decreases not so much in the form of direct cuts, but rather in the
form of lacking inflation adjustments or through having to serve more clients with
the same amount of funding. At the same time, CSOs judged their situation
regarding public funding as rather good, and they reported a stable level of do-
nations. Similarly, Pape et al. (2020) describe Austria’s number of CSOs delivering
social services as stable after the economic crisis. Pennerstorfer, Reitzinger, and
Schneider (2020), however, reveal long-term effects by analyzing administrative
data, finding that the 2008 crisis dampened sector growth. Yearly growth rates of
the social services sector fell from 6.5% in the pre-crisis years to 3% in the years
after the economic crisis. In the end, the number of service providers also shrunk,
indicating market concentration. The decline in the sector’s growth rates after the
2008 crisis can be explained with welfare state retrenchment.
Another more recent development with substantial implications for nonprofit
organizations was the so-called European migrant crisis of 2015, whereby almost
onemillion refugees came to or passed through Austria. Here, the role of CSOs was
discussed not so much in the context of financing, but rather with respect to their
capacity to react rapidly to the challenge. Meyer and Simsa (2018) highlight the
crucial role of CSOs in handling the influx of refugees and their ability to fill the
void left by public authorities. Some CSOs self-organized and worked with sub-
stantial input from volunteers to provide innovative services without public
funding. The overextension of public authorities during this crisis altered the
relation between the public sector and civil society (Simsa and Rothbauer 2016),
bringing CSOs into a stronger position.
The 2020 COVID-19 crisis differs from the economic crisis of 2008 and the
refugee crisis of 2015, amongst others, with respect to its impact on funding. The
financial crisis caused less income cuts, but rather a long-term increase of demand
for social services without an increase in funding provision due to public funding
austerity. Similarly, the refugee crisis caused a tremendous increase of work for
some CSOs in refugee care. In this case however, the government also provided
funding to cover the costs of these measures. In contrast, the COVID-19 crisis led to
an immediate income setback. At its core, it was and is a threat to public health and
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a challenge for the health care system and it triggered strict policies to contain the
spread for the virus, which have caused enormous economic damage and collat-
eral social damage.
Thereby, COVID-19 also presented numerous challenges to CSOs combining
and going beyond the lack of funding or the necessity to expand service provision
experienced in two aforementioned crises: As service providers in the health care
system, they have played a central role in fighting the pandemic (e.g. the Austrian
Red Cross and nonprofit hospitals). As care-providers and social workers, they had
to protect vulnerable groups and employees (e.g. in clinics and residential elderly
care, in social work centers dealing with homelessness and drug addiction issues).
At the same time, due to the overall lockdown, they suffered financially from
income losses and increased expenditures. In labor market integration, CSOs have
been confronted with enormous demands as unemployment rocketed up from
3.8% in November 2019 to 6.2% in June 2020. The figure will most probably remain
rather high, even in the unlikely event of a swift economic recovery (unlikely due to
predictions of another oncoming wave of the pandemic). Therefore, the number of
new challenges facing many social service CSOs are only likely to continue
growing. Moreover, the pandemic simultaneously directly affected the CSOs’
operations, reducing the ability to deliver services and disrupting organizations
practices through the newly imposed contact restrictions.
In response to the current crisis, the Austrian federal government started to
negotiate a fixed-cost subsidy for CSOs in the early stages of the pandemic,with the
initial intention of complementing it with a fixed-cost subsidy granted to all
business organizations.2 One of the authors of this article participated as an expert
advisor in these negotiations, which started in early April 2020 between the Fed-
eral Ministry for Arts, Culture, Civil Service, and Sports and the Federal Ministry of
Finance. The first obstacle in the negotiations was to decide on the amount that
should be dedicated to the nonprofit fund. As Austria still lacks a satellite account
on nonprofits in its system of national accounting (United Nations 2003), the latest
reliable data on the sector’s revenue stem from 2013 (Leisch, Pennerstorfer, and
Schneider 2016). For estimating the potential damage of the government’s mea-
sures, these numbers were adjusted for inflation. The estimation of the potential
COVID-19 damage yielded a likely loss of€700million (see Table 1): For the field of
arts and culture, losses estimated were validated by data on cultural events and
visitors (Pitlik, Fritz, and Streicher 2020). For the field of sports, respective um-
brella organizations contributed estimates of their members. For education, losses
caused by the prohibition of seminars and trainings were estimated by the um-
brella association of the continuing education providers.
2 https://www.bmf.gv.at/en.html.
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This estimate of€700million was taken into account by theMinistry of Finance
by the end of April. Subsequently, negotiations shifted to the federal Ministry of
Tourism and Agriculture, which took the role of counterpart to the Federal Ministry
for Arts, Culture, Civil Service, and Sports. It thus mirrored the two parties of the
coalition government: the conservative People’s Party and the environmentalist
Green Party. This moment in April marked the beginning of some difficult work,
starting with the initial selection and legal definition of beneficiaries of the fund.
This turned out to be an extremely tricky task as there was no legal definition of
nonprofits or CSOs in Austria. There is no specific legal form for CSOs, either: As-
sociations and cooperatives are membership based and comprise the vast majority
of organizations, yet public benefit corporations are establishing a foothold in social
services inparticular. There are also entities of public lawandevenentities of church
law that are considered as significant parts of the CSO landscape. Eventually, it was
decided that the statute in Austrian tax law that defines criteria for being charitable
would serve as aproxy,without restricting the rangeof applicants to thoseCSOswho
had already been granted the respective tax exemption.
After the initial selection and legal definition of beneficiaries of the fund, fixed
costs had to be defined. Being restricted by both European competition law and by
the regulation that was already enacted for business organizations, refundable
Table : Estimation of financial losses for CSOs in different fields of activity (based upon data
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costs did not include personnel costs. Instead, they comprised costs for rents,
maintenance, additional costs for protecting staff and clients, and even support for
keeping the infrastructure running, which was fixed at 7% of the revenue from
2019, i.e. any costs over 7% were not paid out. The overall payout per CSO was
capped at the loss of revenues in 2020 in comparison to that of 2019, and at a total
of €800,000 per CSO. From a comparative perspective, this nonprofit fund is more
generous than the fund for business enterprises in Austria.
The creation of the nonprofit fundmarks a potentially significant change in the
relationship between government and CSOs. Beyond its mere financial dimension,
it is the first regulatory/legislative instrument that has legally acknowledged the
nonprofit sector in Austria. It also expressed the federal government’s re-
sponsibility for CSOs beyond the distribution of competencies in Austria’s
complicated federal system.Other remarkable changes, discussed inmore detail in
our findings section, were already visible before our data collection. These include
the crucial role of the Austrian Red Cross during the whole crisis, the confusion of
different regulations in Austrian provinces, the support of CSOs for the most
vulnerable groups, e.g. in elderly care, and the remarkable lobbying power that
umbrella organizations developed in the field of sports.
3 Methods and Data
We draw our findings on data yielded from 30 semi-structured interviews, an
accompanying quantitative survey among CSOs in social service delivery and a set
of four virtual group discussions hosted by one of the authors with participants
from CSOs in the field of health-care and social services, public agencies and
authorities. Hence, we applied a mixed-methods approach to yield insights into
both the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic itself and the measures sought to fight
the pandemic in the Austrian context.
Our qualitative interviews were conductedwith 30 executives of Austrian social
service CSOs, which we sampled according to fields of activities, number of em-
ployees, and geographical distribution. We focused on organizations providing
social services in the fields of elderly care, housing and homelessness, violence
prevention, disabled persons as well as children and youth. We covered organiza-
tions fromall across Austria, namely the nine regional provinces, in order to obtain a
comprehensive picture and to account for the fact that many fields of social service
provision find their regulatory and public counterparts on a regional level.
In these semi-structured interviews, our questions covered a number of topics,
including basic characteristics of the organization and the effects of the pandemic
on organizational parameters such as funding, income generation, and human
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resources. Moreover, we investigated CSOs’ responses to the imposed restrictions
due to the pandemic on the delivery of services as well as the respective effects on
the respective target groups. We also addressed how CSOs interacted with other
organizations and with public authorities. Interviews were conducted via tele-
phone (apart from one that took place in person) between the end of July and mid-
August 2020. Each lasted 30–60 min. After each interview, the interviewer wrote
short memos capturing the key statements. Subsequently, all interviews were
recorded and transcribed verbatim, and content-analyzed.
In addition to these interviews, we refer to four group discussions that took
place in late September and early October 2020. Each discussion lasted 120 min
and included 7–8 representatives of large nonprofit and public institutions with
expertise in public-third sector collaboration in Austria. We specifically asked
participants to explain their experiences with the collaboration between public
authorities, the public health care system, and CSOs active in the fields of health
care and social services during the first months of the pandemic. The discussions
were videotaped, and the results were clustered to identify themajor strengths and
weaknesses of these collaborations.
We complemented our qualitative data with an online survey. To this end, we
gained access to participants via cooperation with an umbrella organization
comprising 530 CSOs active in the field of social service and health care provision
(“Sozialwirtschaft Österreich”), the members of which total 120,000 staff and
around 200,000 volunteers. The rationale of the quantitative approach was to
validate our findings from the interviews, generate numbers, compare these data
with the business sector, and strengthen our empirical base. Therefore, we aligned
the two approaches in content. The survey covered questions about organizational
structure, fields of activities, and the effects of the pandemic on the organization as
well as on the respective target groups (see also Appendix A). We also included
items to measure CSOs’ reactions and CSOs’ financial reserves to also draw com-
parisons with surveys among Austrian business organizations conducted in April
and May 2020 by the Austrian Institute for Economic research (WIFO, Hölzl, Klien,
and Kügler 2020).
Our questionnaire was sent out on July 22nd and was accessible until August
7th 2020. In total, 167 organizations reacted to the questionnaire, resulting in 99
valid responses. The respondents represented 50,926 staff members, with 45,450
paid employees and 5476 volunteers. This yields an unweighted response rate of
19% and a weighted response rate (with respect to paid staff) of 42%, which is
sufficient for the rather explorative and descriptive purpose of the study. On
average, CSOs of our sample employed 459 persons (median: 37). Breaking down
fields of activities, 52% of the responding CSOs are active in the field of social
and health services (dominated by elderly care), 37% work with people with
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disabilities, 30% with children and youth, 15% on labor market integration, and
9% deal with housing and homelessness. Altogether, the surveyed CSOs cater to
223,006 clients (further descriptive statistics can be found in Appendix B).
4 Findings
CSOs in Austria have been affected by COVID-19 and the measures to fight the
pandemic on various levels. We investigated CSOs providing social services for the
elderly (e.g. residential and home care), for people with disabilities (e.g. training
and occupation), for children and youth (e.g. childcare, kindergarten), for people
concerned by domestic violence, and for the homeless. Figure 1 illustrates the
degree by which organizations in these different fields reported being affected by
the pandemic. Results reveal high levels of affectedness in all fields with a
particularly large share (43%) of strongly affected organizations in the area of
children and youth. In this field, many CSOs terminated all operations due to the
stay-at-home order.
Respondents reported negative effects of the pandemic on different levels,
namely on an organizational level (e.g. with respect to increased costs and sick
staff or staff with care responsibilities), on the respective target groups (e.g.
accessibility), and on the way that organizations have or have not interacted with
Austrian governments (e.g. with respect to funding). As can be seen in Figure 2,
volunteering in organizations was significantly affected due to restrictions of



















Social and health care services (n=52)
Housing and homelessness (n=9)
Children and youth (n=30)
People with disabili es (n=37)
in percent
Not at all Weak Medium Strong Very strong
Figure 1: Degree of affectedness of CSOs in different fields of social services, in percent.
(Source: Millner et al. 2020, 103).
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suffered from at least some form of revenue loss and cost increase, though both
private donations and public subsidies remained widely stable.
In the remainder of this chapter, we will differentiate between (1) CSOs’
financial losses and public support, (2) consequences for CSOs’ operations, ser-
vices, and target groups, (3) developments in the collaboration between govern-
ment and CSOs.
4.1 Financial Losses and Public Support
Many respondents reported financial damage caused by the pandemic and the
public countermeasures. CSOs faced increasing costs due to the provision of
necessary protective equipment and training measures. At the same time, many
experienced a simultaneous decrease in income. Though the latter was not so
grave when compared to organizations in areas such as sports, arts and culture, a
decrease in private donations threatened the financial health of many organiza-
tions, especially those that rely on personalized forms of fundraising. Among our
survey respondents, 37% reported severe increases in personnel costs, caused
by overtime hours and a Corona premium that was paid to all employees in
caregiving. Almost 60% of the CSOs reported substantial extra costs for protective
Figure 2: Areas of affectedness of social service CSOs in all fields (n = 99).
(Source: Millner et al. 2020, 104).
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equipment. Comparatively, the implementation of telework and digital solutions
represented less of a strain on budgets, with only 14% of the CSOs reporting it to
have been a large burden.
Half of the CSOs in the survey sample report a severe decrease in revenue. CSOs
with a high share of earned income from markets and social enterprise business
models experienced severe and existential decreases in income,while organizations
with revenue from public sources (subsidies, performance contracts) remained less
affected. However, some CSOs funded by performance contracts with governmental
bodies suffered from their partners shutting down all operations, either federal and
provincial agencies, or autonomous social security agencies. Even in cases in which
costs were subsequently covered, delayed payments had an adverse effect on or-
ganizations’ liquidity. In comparison, CSOs funded by subsidies reported that their
financial situation remained largely stable. Hence, they were able to continue their
work and balance additional costs with a reallocation of resources within their
different sets of activities. Consequently, theydid not apply for any financial support
from the respective governmental crisis funds.
By end of September, more than 9000 CSOs had applied for financial support
from the federal nonprofit fund, and the volume of the subsidies applied for
exceeded€200million. Almost€190million of support has already been approved
and almost€100million had been paid out by end of September 2020 (see Table 2).
Table 3 shows that themajority of CSOs that applied for financial support come
from sports and recreation, whereas the biggest share ofmoney has been allocated
to CSOs in social services. In this field, the average amount of financial support
paid out is above €142,000 per CSO. This corresponds with the fact that CSOs in
social services are by far bigger than CSOs in other fields, which again is a result of
the corporatist structure of the Austrian welfare state with the public authorities’
preference to contract with a rather small number of bigger service providers.
CSOs applied different tactics to tackle their financial and operational prob-
lems (see Figure 3). During and after the lockdown, a majority of CSOs introduced
and enforced telework. Furthermore, 59% of the larger CSOs and 41% of all re-
spondents applied for the short-time-work program, which allowed employees to
reduce their working hours without reducing salaries proportionally (e.g. 30% of
Table : State of applications for the federal nonprofit fund by end of September .
Number of applications ,
Volume of financial support applied for (in millions of Euros) .
Volume already approved (in millions of Euros) .
Volume paid out (in millions of Euros) .
(Source: Austrian Parliament ).
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the working time, 80% of the salary). This program is funded by the public labor
agency. Larger CSOs also used public securities and guarantees for liquidity loans,
and almost a third of them postponed planned investments. Only 3% of our re-
spondents had to lay off employees.
Hence, CSOs with output-based funding relations (such as performance con-
tracts) with the public sector reported the need formore security in funding. Across
data sources, respondents called for more flexible funding schemes that are more
closely tailored around the organizations’ needs. In addition, several respondents
pointed out that the uncertainty regarding which costs would be covered, and by
whom they would be covered by, likewise imposed significant challenges on CSO
executives and employees.
With respect to organizations’ financial reserves, the dark sides of the
corporatist welfare regime became visible. In the field of social service provision,
CSOs as suppliers are often in an oligopoly with respect to the public sector as the
dominant monopolistic payer. In the Austrian federal system, social services are
essentially in the responsibility of provincial governments. They use their bar-
gaining power for exerting pressure on prices, resulting in a revenue situation that
does not allow CSOs to build up sufficient financial slack. As shown in Table 4, the
majority of CSOs in our quantitative survey estimated that liquidity reserves even
in the best case would last only for an additional six months. In the most likely
case, around 70% predict that they would not survive longer than six months, and
in the worst case 77% would run out of cash within half a year. Liquidity is much













, % . %
Arts and culture , % . %
Religion , % . %
Voluntary fire
brigades
, % . %
Social and health
care services
 % . %
Education, research
and science
 % . %
Other  % . %
Total , % . %
(Source: Austrian Parliament ). This table provides a snapshot only as the application period lasted until
the end of December . Arguably, especially bigger organizations waited until the end of the application
period, because an application at a later stage allowed for claiming income losses for a longer time period.
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Figure 3: CSOs’ reactions to financial stress, according to organizational size (n = 99).
(Source: Millner et al. 2020, 110).
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better in Austrian business organizations: Surveyed with the same question, more
than 50% of them report reserves that last longer than half a year, even in worst
case, and almost a third of them do not expect any bottlenecks in liquidity (Hölzl,
Klien, and Kügler 2020, 11).
4.2 Operations, Services, and Target Groups
CSOs were not only hit financially. In many cases the effects of the pandemic
increased their workload, and the short-time-work program popular with busi-
nesses was much less helpful for CSOs. Where we see that more than 60% of all
businesses have registered employees for the short-time-work program (Hölzl,
Klien, and Kügler 2020, 7), only 40% of the CSOs of our sample did. In qualitative
interviews, respondents reported that they often reorganized entire work units, or
created new services or channels to be able to serve their beneficiaries while
fulfilling the new safety measures required to tackle COVID-19. This increased
workload during the pandemic distinguishes them from many companies in
Austria. Social-service CSOs rather contributed to stabilization of the economy and
the labor market with their comparatively smaller share of layoffs and short-time-
work. Still, 40% of CSOs registering employees for the short-time-work program is
a remarkable share, resulting from the composition of social services that
continued to full extent such as residential care, and others that were widely
abandoned, such as social street work.
We therefore also asked CSOs how strongly their clients have been affected by
the pandemic (see Figure 4). Most obviously, clients were strongly affected by the
restrictions of personal freedoms and the banning of visits to relatives, e.g. in
residential care. In a similar vein, CSOs are veryworried about threats to themental
health of their clients, also resulting from restrictions in personal communication
and by the fact that many patients with mental disorders have somehow gone into
Table : Estimated development of liquidity in best, most likely, and worst case (n = ).








 . . .
 . . .
 . . .
 . . .
 . . .
> . . .
(Source: Adapted from Millner et al. , ).
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hiding, terminating their treatment. Likewise, restrictions of services, such as
group counseling or joint activities have beenmassively detrimental to the clients.
Due to the lockdown, access to the public space was drastically restricted, and
care homes, day centers, shop floors and salesrooms, etc. were closed, in turn
cutting down the social contact of all target groups. This was aggravated by the
shutdown of public infrastructure relevant for CSOs to deliver their services
effectively (such as canceled court hearings, or the closure of playgrounds). Being
among the most vulnerable in society, these restrictions have put all sorts of stress
not only on the beneficiaries and clients, but also to the CSO employees working
with them. Not only did the restrictions impose many forms of stress onto the most
vulnerable in society, but also indirectly onto the CSO employees working with
these people. Daily structures and routines, key ingredients in social work, had
suddenly dissolved. If at all possible, their restricted capability to cope with and
adapt to new technologies created non-acceptance among the target group in
many cases; e.g. people with disabilities or those suffering from dementia in the
case of wearing masks. Group therapies and services could not be carried out any
more due to physical distancing requirements. As personal contact is important for
an effective and humane delivery of social services to the target groups, CSOs had
to cope with an additional layer of psychological stress during the lockdown and
the following period.
To summarize, social service CSOs of any kind faced specific hardships due to
the lockdown’s impact on their clients and the need for them to restructure their
operations completely. In particular, in elderly care, protective measures for cli-
ents and staff, as well as the closure of residential institutions to visitors weremost
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Figure 4: Affectedness of clients of social service CSOs in all fields (n = 99).
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the school-closure combined with home schooling terminated most operations,
and have deepened the educational divide. For CSOs dealing with domestic
violence, the lockdown brought more emergency cases but with less opportunities
for CSOs to make successful interventions. Work integration CSOs face increased
demands caused by the rocketing unemployment rate.
4.3 Collaboration Between CSOs and Government
In our quantitative survey, almost 50% of the respondents report satisfaction with
the support measures launched by the government, another 35% report neutrality.
Only in cases where CSOs work with children and youth is the dissatisfaction rate
significantly higher (50%; see Figure 5). This corresponds with the observation
amongst all policy fields that education from kindergarten to high-school (K-12)
performed worse during the pandemic, and CSOs received little support from
public authorities. Leaving K-12 aside, the analysis of the collaboration between
CSOs and government yields multifaceted results.
It goes without saying that the time pressure to react to the spread of the
pandemic has put a huge burden on the public sector. In addition to the numerous
newwork demands created through the pandemic and the countermeasures, CSOs
had to deal with a high level of ambiguity. Many CSOs reported that they had
wished for stricter and clearer safety regulations instead ofmere recommendations



























Percent of respondents 
Very satisfied Satisfied Neutral Dissatisfied Very dissatisfied
Figure 5: CSOs’ satisfaction with support from government (social service CSOs in all fields;
n = 44), in percent.
(Source: Millner et al. 2020, 116).
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difficult, especially at the beginning, and sometimes resulted in a call for more
centralized coordination among Austrian CSOs. Hence, regulations would have
needed more details and stability, instead of rapidly implemented governmental
enactments. CSOs also demanded better communication from the side of public
sector about measures taken.
Our group discussions with nonprofit and public sector representatives in late
September and early October 2020 shed further light on the public-third sector
collaboration during the pandemic. The discussions focused on the strengths and
weaknesses of the collaboration between various levels of government and the CSOs
active in social and health care services and revealed three overarching themes:
First, collaboration worked best within frameworks that have already existed
in some form before the COVID-19 outbreak, and where trust between the partners
had been established before. For instance, provincial and federal governments
each established emergency task forces in which CSOs were invited to collaborate
from the beginning on, with an increasing number of CSOs involved. At the
beginning, primarily the Austrian Red Cross participated in the major task force.
Over the course of the lockdown, however, specialized task forces and crisis teams
were established at different regional levels and for different fields. The more trust
had already been built up in former cooperation, the better these new collabora-
tions worked. In the City of Vienna, for instance, the umbrella organization for
social service providers together with the Vienna public health care authorities
managed procurement and distribution of protective equipment. In any case, the
CSOs’ and public authorities’ welfare and common good orientation proved as a
strong underpinning for the emergence of trust in the collaboration.
Second, rapid digitalization and switching to digital forms of communication
was perceived as a strong enabling technology for collaboration, apart from the
case of telemedicine, where it was also perceived as a result of good collaboration
between public authorities, health-care providers, and caregivers. The swift
implementation of new technologies brought on by the pandemic has accelerated
processes and coordination between government and CSOs.
Third, in spite of pre-existing trust and merits of digital collaboration,
collaboration turned out to be bumpy in many cases. One frequently mentioned
challenge was the confusion caused by the multiple layers of Austrian federalism.
In many fields, standards and regulations were either lacking or different between
provinces, thus causing confusion in CSOs. For instance, the government decided
to pay a Corona premium for employees in various social services, as they had to
continue operations throughout the period of total lockdown when others were
required to stay at home. Most CSOs paid this premium to the employees in July
and applied for reimbursement, yet it was unclear, whether provincial govern-
ments were responsible for this refund (as they were the main funders of these
Partnership in Times of COVID-19 19
CSOs) or the federal nonprofit fund would cover the cost (as the federal govern-
ment had announced the premium).
In Austrian governments’ policies to fight the pandemic, a single CSO played a
pivotal role: the Austrian Red Cross. With 133 local units, 9000 staff members,
75,000 volunteers and more than a million members and supporters, the Austrian
Red Cross is possibly the most powerful CSO in the country. From the early days of
the pandemic on, the Red Cross played a decisive role in the emergency task forces
at all levels. It took responsibility for gathering the PCR tests, it collaborated with
the government in launching an information campaign on the pandemic and it
developed and offered a smartphone app for contact tracing. In the course of our
qualitative inquiry, other CSOs complained about a lack of integration in emer-
gency task forces on federal level in the early weeks in spring, and that they were
not informed sufficiently.
Most emergency task forces were formed either among CSOs and peers in their
respective fields, or with the participation of provincial governmental bodies. In
particular, CSOs focusing on specific target groups and smaller organizations
wished to have been more involved in respective task forces and governmental
decision making based on their to specific expertise with regard to clients and
client work. It was generally reported that a deeper involvement of the wider social
service sector in governmental decisionswould have been appreciated, rather than
what was perceived as the dominance of individual, usually larger, CSOs.
The federalist governmental structure of Austria regulates the competencies of
providing social services in a rather complicated way. This also resulted in double
andmultiple burdens for CSOs. The different governmental frameworks across the
nine Austrian regions and at the federal level sometimes created confusion and
uncertainty, not only in terms of funding, but also in terms COVID-19 related rules
and regulations that had to be dealt with. General enactments on the federal level
had to be further specified and carried out on the regional level. Consequently,
some provincial governments seem to have been more pragmatic and flexible in
their handling of their partnerships with social service providers.
5 Discussion
Generally speaking, Austria’s civil society has a partnership and a cooperative
relationshipwith government, which is coined by a corporatist welfare regime. The
COVID-19 pandemic has massively challenged all institutional actors in this
framework. In this study, we have outlined the financial situation, operational and
client-oriented aspects, and the public-CSO collaborations as impact areas. In all of
them, the fabric of the corporatist welfare systemhasmet the challenges until now,
but zones of specific vulnerability have become visible.
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At the same time, CSOs in the field of social service provisionhave also acted as
stabilizers of the economy. Compared to for-profit firms, they were considerably
less frequently laying off staff or using short-time work, once again emphasizing
the importance of social services for the society and economy. The government has
also recognized this significant role of CSOs in providing stable services, which is
indicated by the quick establishment of funding support for them. This nonprofit
fund partly helped reducing dependency on other public funders, at least in a
short-term perspective. More precisely, the support from the federal government
decreased dependence on contracts with provincial government bodies.
Due to their low levels of financial reserves, CSOs in social services and health-
care are especially vulnerable to economic shocks such as that, which resulted from
the lockdown period. Constant under-funding of social services as a result of limited
cost of living adjustments by the public sector has reduced the organizations’ ability
to bridge short-term revenue losses. CSOs that are mainly funded by performance
contracts with the public authorities were often hit especially hard by the lockdown
since theywere not able to deliver (and charge for) their services. Organizationswith
higher levels of grant funding mentioned severe financial losses less often. Hence,
with theongoing increase in service contracting combinedwithonlymodest funding
adjustments, CSOs inAustria have beenmade aware of the pressure to becomemore
efficient in delivering their social services over the past years. This development has
reduced the organizational capacity of CSOs to absorb external shocks such as the
pandemic or other crises. Similar results can be observed for the issue of innovation
in CSOs, whereby the absence of slack resources can have negative effects on the
capability to come up with new processes or services (Meyer and Leitner 2018). This
suggests reconsidering the financial aspect of the collaboration. More slack or a
higher level of financial reserves might help to cope better with unforeseeable cir-
cumstances and reduce the resource dependence on public budgets, which are
overstrained anyway in times of crises. This also relates to the observation that the
larger the CSO, the better they are currently able to copewith crisesfinancially. They
showmore flexibility in their ability to reallocate funds, often based on their variety
of funding sources, and personnel between different units that have been hit by the
restrictions in different ways.
Many CSOs, in particular smaller ones that focus on very specific areas, have
developed a high degree of resource dependence from public authorities during
the COVID-19 crisis. They were reactive rather than active, waiting for government
help and action. There is a tradition of CSOs being on the short leash of govern-
mental funding. Hence, the partnership has turned from being on equal terms to a
rather paternalistic relation. From a short-term and rather cynical power
perspective, public authorities might benefit from these asymmetries, as they
might soften critical advocacy and make CSOs compliant and submissive. Insofar,
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the corporatist nonprofit regime has generated symptoms of paternalism. CSOs
won’t “bite the hand that feeds them” (Almog-Bar and Schmid 2014; Neumayr,
Meyer, and Schneider 2015). In the long run, however, this dependence and the
lack of organization slack will not only strain public budgets in times of crises, it
will also turn CSOs into less innovative and effective agents in the implementation
of public welfare policies.
Beyond the resource dependence of many CSOs, a rather modest level of
ambiguity tolerance appeared as a second zone of vulnerability. After the first
tough weeks of the state of emergency when national governance was dominated
by order and obedience, regulations became more differentiated, revealing many
conflicts and untouched and unregulated areas. Both in our interviews and in the
group discussions,many respondents complained about these states of ambiguity,
yet we found little reflection about the temporary inevitability of such situations
when no one has routines available. Yet, the government did little to incentivize
CSOs’ entrepreneurial activities before. Again, for enhancing autonomous and
flexible reactions on crises, government should reflect on the way that their
funding schemes work, with particular regard to the trade-off between business
income and grants, and how not to financially penalize CSOs that are successful in
gaining market income and donations.
Of course, our study suffers from some limitations. In our analysis, we focused
predominately on formal CSOs with paid staff in the field of social service and their
relation with public authorities. Therefore, we do not know how grassroots and
social movement organizations, neighborhood initiatives, and small CSOs are
affected by the pandemic. Neither can we report about its impact on individual
civic engagement, though preliminary results from a different data set of the au-
thors on volunteering and private giving do not indicate major changes in this
domain. Furthermore, it is important to point out that the study mainly described
the first months of the pandemic in Austria, neglecting developments at later
stages. Finally, both our qualitative and our quantitative sample may suffer from
some bias. Whereas we did our best to ask CSOs that present the breadth of
Austrian social service CSOs in our quantitative sample, it is difficult to assess the
non-response bias in the quantitative sample.
What do we learn from the Austrian case? Austria serves as an example for a
welfare partnership between public authorities and CSOs. The parties involved in
this framework of formal and informal contracts have established a trustworthy
relationship that goes beyond mere transactional collaboration. In times of crises,
such a relational setting provides effective channels for trustful communication,
facilitating swift response. This collaboration, however, tends to reinforce de-
pendencies and paternalistic tendencies, which may also hinder CSOs from acting
autonomously and creatively.
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Appendix A Survey Questionnaire
Your Organization During COVID-19
1. In which year was your organization founded?
2. Please indicate the number of employees in your organization, irrespective of
their weekly hours of work: a) paid employees, b) volunteers
3. In which area is your organization active? (Social and health care services,
housing and homelessness, children and youth, people with disabilities, violence
prevention, labor market integration)
4. How many individuals does your organization serve (clients, beneficiaries)?
5. How are your clients and beneficiaries distributed across the following service
areas? (0–100%) a) social and health care services, b) housing and home-
lessness, c) children and youth, d) people with disabilities, e) violence preven-
tion, f) labor market integration, g) other
6. On what regional level are you active? (in close neighborhood/county level,
district level, regional level, nationwide, international level)
7. How does COVID-19 affect your organization’s activities in general? (1-very
negatively – 5-very positively)
8. How strongly were your activities affected in the following areas? (1-not at
all – 5-very strongly): a) social and health care services, b) housing and
homelessness, c) children and youth, d) people with disabilities, e) violence
prevention, f) labor market integration, g) other
9. How strongly were the following areas in your organization affected by
COVID-19? (1-very negatively – 7-very positively) a) income from service fees, b)
costs, c) working capacity of staff (e.g. lack of access to workspace, private care
obligations), d) capacity of volunteers, e) cases of COVID-19 among staff, f)
services, g) accessibility of target groups, h) income from donations, i) public
funding, j) other
10. Our clients are negatively affected by … (1-not at all – 5-very strongly) a)
COVID-19 illness, b) unemployment, c) short-time work, d) other loss of income,
e) contact restrictions, f) constraints on our services, g) strains on mental
wellbeing
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11. Which of the following measures did your organizations take because of the
COVID-19 pandemic? (increasing usage of existing credit line, using new
financing instruments, accessing of state-guaranteed liquidy aids, postponing
payments, postponing investments, layoffs, introduction/increasing use of home
office, application of short-time-work program, investing into training and ca-
pacity building, developing new services and offers, other)
Financial Situation
12. What was your organizations revenue in 2019 (in €)?
13. Please estimate the share of the following sources in your organization’s revenue
in 2019 (0–100%) a) private donations, philanthropic grants, b) public sub-
sidies, c) service contracts with public or quasi-public institutions, d) fees for
selling goods and services, e) other
14. Please estimate: how strongly will COVID-19 affect costs and income in the
following categories in 2020? (1-not at all – 5-very strongly) a) additional
personnel costs, b) COVID-19 related bonus payments, c) protective equipment,
d) transition to home office, e) other additional costs, f) loss of income (fees from
clients, donations, sponsoring, g) loss of income (other)
15. Please estimate: how strongly will COVID-19 influence savings and additional
income in the following categories in 2020? (1-not at all – 5-very strongly) a)
personnel cost savings (due to short-time work, layoffs), b) material costs sav-
ings, c) public COVID-aid, d) additional revenue, e) other
16. Where there any positive developments in your organization due to the COVID-19
pandemic (e.g. development of new activities, offers, services, mobilizing of new
volunteers, learning)?
17. Who are the most important funders of your organization? a) name up to three,
b) did these funders make commitments to refund COVID-19 related additional
expenditures?
18. Which of the following COVID-19 support measures offered by the Austrian
government did you reveive? (Short-time-work program, Nonprofit Fund, Hard-
ship Case Fund [“Härtefallfonds”], Corona Help Fund [guarantees], fix cost
support [not for charitable organizations], other)
19. How satisfied are you with the support offers provided by the Austrian govern-
ment? (1-very unsatisfied – 5-very satisfied)
20. Please estimate: in howmany months will the situation normalize again for your
organization and your clients in the best, most likely and worst case? (months
best/most likely/worst case) a) normalization for our organization, b) normali-
zation for our clients, c) How long will your liquidity reserves last?
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21. Which concrete socio-political measures do you recommend to the Austrian
government to overcome the challenges posed by the COVID-19 pandemic?
Background
22. What legal form best describes your organization? (association, charitable
private limited company, non-charitable organization, organization in/with
strong affiliation to the public sector, other)
23. What is your role in the organization? (director/management/board, middle
management, employee, other)
Appendix B Summary Statistics






Founding year of organization    .
Number of paid staff     
Number of unpaid staff    
Revenue  (in thousand Euros)      
Income fromprivate donations andphilanthropic grants (%
of overall revenue)
 .% .% .%
Income from public subventions (% of overall revenue)  .% .% .%
Income from service contracts with public or quasi-public
institutions (% of overall revenue)
 .% .% .%
Income from selling services and goods (% of overall
revenue)
 .% .% .%
Legal form: association  .% .% .%
Legal form: chartable private limited company  .% .% .%
Legal form: association & charitable plc  .% .% .%
Legal form: non-charitable organization  .% .% .%
Legal form: organization in/with strong affiliation to the
public sector
 .% .% .%
Legal form: fund  .% .% .%
Number of people served (social and health care services)      
Number of people served (housing and homelessness)    
Number of people served (children and youth)     
Number of people served (people with disabilities)    
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